Former President Joe Biden has again faced a unanimous setback from the U.S. Supreme Court—this time in a criminal sentencing case that included the participation of his own nominee, Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson. In a 9–0 decision, the Court ruled that certain individuals previously convicted of gun-related offenses may be eligible for reduced prison terms because their sentences can legally run at the same time, rather than sequentially.

Justice Jackson authored the opinion, emphasizing that the Court’s role is to apply the law exactly as Congress has written it. “Congress could certainly have designed the penalty scheme at issue here differently. But Congress did not do any of these things. And we must implement the design Congress chose,” she wrote.

At the center of the case is the interpretation of two subsections within federal statute 18 U.S.C. § 924, a law that outlines penalties for firearm-related crimes. Subsection (c) details specific gun offenses and explicitly states that any sentence under that subsection cannot run concurrently with another prison term. However, subsection (j), which was added later to the statute, describes separate offenses and punishments but does not contain language requiring consecutive sentencing.

Normally, federal judges have broad discretion to decide whether multiple prison terms in a single case should run at the same time (concurrently) or one after the other (consecutively). But when a statute requires consecutive sentencing—like subsection (c)—that discretion is removed. The question before the Supreme Court was whether the mandatory consecutive-sentencing rule of subsection (c) also applies to crimes charged under subsection (j).

The case involved Efrain Lora, who was convicted of aiding and abetting a firearm user during a violent or drug-related crime, as well as conspiring to distribute narcotics. Lora and several accomplices were involved in cocaine trafficking in New York City in the early 2000s, and prosecutors said the group murdered a rival dealer during a territorial conflict in 2002.

U.S. District Judge Paul Gardephe—appointed by President George W. Bush—interpreted the law to mean that Lora’s sentences must be served consecutively. As a result, Lora received 25 years for the drug conspiracy charge, plus an additional five years for the firearm-related offense. A federal appeals court later upheld that sentence.

On appeal to the Supreme Court, Lora’s legal team argued that the law Judge Gardephe relied upon does not apply to aiding and abetting offenses charged under subsection (j), and therefore the sentences should have been eligible to run concurrently. Surprisingly, federal prosecutors urged the Court not to take the case at all, maintaining that the lower courts had already correctly interpreted the statute.

But the Supreme Court disagreed unanimously.

In her opinion, Justice Jackson explained that subsection (c)’s requirement for consecutive sentencing applies only to offenses sentenced under that subsection. Because subsection (j) is a separate provision—even though both relate to firearm crimes—its penalties do not automatically inherit the consecutive-sentencing rule.

“Subsection (c)’s consecutive-sentence mandate applies only to the terms of imprisonment prescribed within subsection (c). A sentence imposed under subsection (j) does not qualify,” she wrote. Jackson also cautioned that mixing the two subsections’ rules could create conflicts in the law. In certain scenarios, she noted, such an interpretation might produce sentencing ranges in which a legally required minimum would be greater than the statutory maximum—an impossible outcome.

Because of the Court’s ruling, Lora’s sentence was vacated and the case was sent back to a lower court for a new sentencing hearing. His legal team celebrated the decision, calling it a victory for judicial discretion and fairness.

“We are thrilled that the Court preserved the longstanding default of discretion in criminal sentencing, restoring courts’ discretion to impose either concurrent or consecutive sentences in this case and others like it,” said Lawrence Rosenberg, one of Lora’s attorneys. He added that enforcing the plain text of the statute helps ensure that punishments are tailored to both the crime and the individual circumstances.

During oral arguments earlier in the year, Justice Jackson signaled her concerns about the government’s interpretation. She questioned why prosecutors believed they were entitled to the sentencing structure of subsection (c) when subsection (j) “doesn’t say” that its penalties should be tied to it. Jackson noted that Congress could have easily written the statute more explicitly.

A representative for the Justice Department, Erica Ross, responded that the statute also does not explicitly support Lora’s interpretation—but the Court ultimately found the government’s reading unpersuasive.

The unanimous ruling marks another moment where the Court, including justices appointed by presidents of both parties, has constrained federal sentencing practices by sticking closely to the letter of the law rather than deferring to government arguments.