“The Silent Sweep: Inside DNI Gabbard’s Secret Crackdown on Leakers”

DNI Gabbard Orders Study Into Random Polygraphs Amid Leak Surge

Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard has quietly instructed the U.S. intelligence community to explore whether instituting random polygraph screenings for employees and contractors might serve as a stronger deterrent against unauthorized leaks of classified information. The directive, issued within the past month in a classified memo, comes in response to a string of recent leaks that intelligence officials say have compromised delicate operations and trust with partners abroad.


A Target on Internal Security

The review ordered by Gabbard would not launch an entirely new testing apparatus; rather, it aims to build upon existing polygraph protocols already in use across many agencies. What’s new is the possibility of increasing both the frequency and randomness of those tests — meaning an employee or contractor might be called in unexpectedly, without prior warning, to answer targeted questions about unauthorized disclosures or communications with the media.

One senior official described the goal as reinforcing internal discipline: “We’re trying to see whether random checks can sharpen the accountability of cleared personnel, reminding everyone that sensitive information is not to be mishandled.”

The push comes at a time of elevated concern over internal threat vulnerabilities. In recent months, leaks have exposed sensitive cables, diplomatic communications, and operational details — prompting alarm at the highest levels of U.S. intelligence.


From Secrecy to Spotlight

Gabbard’s directive is part of a broader escalation in enforcement and oversight around classified materials. Across various agencies, actions have been taken or proposed to tighten discipline: investigations into leaks, criminal referrals, and administrative crackdowns. The memo reportedly asks agency heads to include media‑contact questions in future polygraph exams — specifically probing whether any cleared individual has discussed classified content outside authorized channels.

An ODNI spokesperson acknowledged the existence of the directive, calling it a “routine reinforcement” of long-standing legal and ethical responsibilities. They emphasized that recent public disclosures about the leak issue only underscore the necessity of the guidance — a direct illustration of the challenges the policy addresses.


Polygraphs: Tool or Trouble?

Polygraph testing—commonly understood as lie detection—has a longstanding role in intelligence and counterintelligence environments. These tests generally cover topics such as espionage, sabotage, loyalty, and the proper handling of classified data. But their use is uneven, and their reliability remains a matter of debate.

Critics argue that polygraphs can yield false positives or negatives, be influenced by stress or medical conditions, and foster an atmosphere of distrust. Some employees already subjected to rigorous vetting worry that surprise screenings could create morale problems.

On the other hand, supporters say polygraphs serve not only as a detection tool but as a psychological deterrent: the possibility of an unexpected test can discourage risk-taking. A few former intelligence officials have privately suggested that clarity and transparency in how such tests are administered will be essential to retaining employee confidence.


The Rationale and the Risks

Officials familiar with the directive say part of the motivation is a noticeable decline in the use of polygraph tests over recent years across some agencies, which intelligence insiders believe has weakened deterrence. In some quarters, they say, cleared personnel may have felt less exposed to scrutiny, potentially creating space for leaks.

But the new approach must walk a fine line. Intelligence insiders caution that surprise exams must be carefully designed to avoid overreach, and that fairness and due process must be preserved. If used poorly, the tool could erode trust within agencies and give rise to internal resistance or accusations of politicization.

Some former intelligence officers argue that successful implementation will depend largely on open communication about purpose and procedure. One retired official said: “If people see these tests as anti‑employee rather than protective of national interests, you lose the very cooperation you need.”


What Could Change

If adopted, the expanded polygraph protocol might extend to key agencies across the intelligence community: CIA, NSA, DIA, and others. Contractors with security clearances could also come under scrutiny. Random examinations might occur at irregular intervals and involve focused questions about whether an individual has shared classified details or had unauthorized contact with the press.

In parallel, the directive mandates that agencies review internal controls: tracing document access logs, tightening audit trails, and refining training on how classified materials should be handled. Inspectors General may also play a greater role in identifying patterns in past leaks and recommending structural fixes.


The Bigger Tension

Gabbard’s move reflects an enduring tension at the heart of intelligence work: maintaining operational secrecy while respecting constitutional protections and morale within agencies. While U.S. law prohibits unauthorized disclosure of classified information, the press often depends on leaks to hold power accountable. The new policy is intended as an internal safeguard, not a crackdown on journalism or legitimate reporting.

Use of surprise polygraphs would represent a more aggressive posture within that paradigm — a signal that the intelligence community is leaning harder into internal discipline to match external pressure.


Next Steps & Watchpoints

The review phase is expected to last up to 90 days. At its conclusion, Gabbard and ODNI leadership will decide whether to roll out the expanded system, refine a pilot program, or adopt alternate approaches.

Key questions to watch:

  • How much pushback the proposal gets from agencies and cleared personnel

  • Whether pilot programs are launched in one or more agencies

  • How questions about media contacts and leaks are crafted and enforced

  • The results of internal audits on recent leaks and the gaps identified

  • Whether additional measures, like stricter document access controls, are adopted

In her guidance, Gabbard reportedly invoked the principle that protecting classified information is a collective responsibility. She stressed that regardless of rank or position, every cleared individual “must uphold the sacred trust” to safeguard what they know.

At its core, the review underscores a renewed focus on the delicate balance between operational security, organizational trust, and the ever-present risk of sensitive disclosures. As U.S. intelligence grapples with evolving digital and geopolitical threats, this directive may signal a shift toward more vigilant internal oversight—one that could reshape how secrecy is enforced from the inside out.

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *